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Not Guilty by Reason of
Neuroimaging: The Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions for
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal
Trials
ABSTRACT

Neuroimaging technology gives researchers the ability to see
structures and functions of the human brain. As the technology
advances, it is beginning to change the way the legal field understands
the brain and its impact on legal concepts of capacity, sanity, guilt,
and innocence. However, the sophisticated technology poses risks that
juries will misunderstand the limits of the science or misapply the
technical findings to a particularcase. To combat the risk of undue
prejudice, this Note proposes a cautionaryjury instruction designed to
remind jurors of the technical and legal limits of bringingneuroimages
into the courtroom.
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The field of neuroscience is a window to the human brain.
Neuroimaging technology gives researchers the ability to see
structures and functions of the human brain.
As scientific
understanding of the brain improves, neuroscience discovers new
possibilities for ethical, social, and legal analyses of human behavior.1
Specifically, neuroscience researchers seek to understand how human
behavior, emotions, and cognitive processes are influenced by the
brain. 2
If researchers can use neuroimages to show a direct
relationship between the brain and mental and behavioral processes,
neuroscience could impact the legal analysis of personal responsibility
for past actions, assessment of a person's existing state of mind, and
prediction of future behavior.3
Although technology may never
advance to such a point, the mere possibility of new discoveries in
neuroscience has generated an enormous amount of interest in the
4
relationship between the brain structure and human behavior.
The legal field has begun to explore how neuroscience could
impact the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of the law.5 For
example, during the confirmation hearing for the nomination of Chief
1.
0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2007).
2.
Id. at 1273.
3.
Henry T. Greely, Remarks at the Reagan Lecture, Santa Clara University Markkula
Ethics Center Lecture Series, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience (April 20, 2004), available at
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/greely/neuroscience-ethics-law.html.
4.
Snead, supra note 1, at 1265.
5.
Id. at 1268.
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Justice John Roberts to the Supreme Court, Senator Joe Biden of
Delaware asked Mr. Roberts whether he thought "brain scans [could]
be used to determine whether a person is inclined toward criminality
or violent behavior" and suggested that Judge Roberts would be asked
6
to rule on such a question during his tenure on the Supreme Court.
Neuroimaging has already begun to impact the types of
evidence available in court. For example, in civil cases, neuroscience
evidence can be used to prove actual harm in tort or to show that a
party lacked sufficient cognitive capacity to form a valid contract. 7 In
the criminal context, defendants have used neuroscience evidence to
show diminished capacity or insanity during the guilt phase and as a
form of mitigating evidence during sentencing.8 As brain imaging
techniques continue to gain scientific validity and acceptance,
neuroscience will have an increasing impact on many areas of the
legal field. 9
In fact, some scholars predict that advances in
neuroscience will one day "dominate the entire legal system." 10
While such advances may provide a new form of evidence for
parties in the justice system, such novel and complex technology has
great potential to be misused or misunderstood.
Lawyers, judges,
and jurors may not fully understand the limits of the technology and
may believe that neuroscience evidence is infallible truth.1 2 For
example, scholars suggest that jurors are likely to overestimate the
significance of expert testimony, particularly where the expert's
13
conclusions are supported by sophisticated or "hard" science.
Furthermore, depending on how the witness presents the findings and

6.
Id. at 1266.
7.
Id. at 1291.
8.
Id.
9.
An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Lau (President's
Council on Bioethics, Working Paper) [hereinafter President's Council Overview], available at
http://bioethicsprint.bioethics.gov/background/neuroscience-evidence.html.
10.

Snead, supra note 1, at 1268 (quoting MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN

88 (2005)).
11.
Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the
Image: An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 182-84
(2007).
12.
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that scientific
evidence is "likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of
Delphi"); Paul Bloom, Seduced by the Flickering Lights of the Brain, SEED, June 27, 2006,
available at http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2006/06/seduced by the flickering ligh.php.
13.
Richard H. Underwood, Commentary, Evaluating Scientific and Forensic Evidence,
24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149, 166 (2000) (citing William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 183 (1987)).

VANDERBILTJ. OFENT.AND TECH LAW

[Vol. 12:2:333

the lawyers' skills in direct and cross examination, the nature of the
adversary process may distort the importance, relevance, and limits of
complex scientific technology. 14 Linking expert testimony about a
party's mental functioning with illustrations of that individual's brain
could have a profound impact on juror opinions and, consequentially,
on the outcome of legal proceedings.15
Currently, many neuroscientists and legal scholars encourage
trial judges to avoid these risks by excluding most forms of
neuroscience evidence from the guilt phase of criminal trials. 16 Many
trial courts have taken the advice and done just that.1 7 However,
because trial judges have broad discretion in admitting and excluding
evidence,18 there is no guarantee that only reliable evidence will be
admitted or that shaky or potentially unreliable evidence will be
excluded. Further, as neuroscience technology becomes more reliable,
courts may begin to find that the probative value of such evidence
outweighs the risk of confusing the jury. 19 Therefore, the legal
community should be aware of the full range of benefits and risks of
using neuroscience evidence, and courts should be prepared to instruct
jurors as to its precise risks and pitfalls.
This Note suggests a uniform cautionary jury instruction that
can be used in any court to encourage the responsible use of
neuroimaging evidence during criminal trials. Part I reviews the
admissibility standards for scientific evidence and briefly examines
some additional devices that courts may use to ensure that jurors
receive only relevant and reliable evidence. Part II examines some
current uses for neuroimaging in the courtroom, focusing on its use
during the guilt phase of criminal trials. Part III identifies a variety
of risks posed by neuroimaging evidence, including the risk that the
jury will misunderstand the technical limits of neuroscience, will be
overly-influenced by the evidence, or will misinterpret the significance
of the evidence as it relates to a defendant's behavior and mental

14.
Id. at 167-68.
15.
See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Note, PsychiatricNeuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech
Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1269-70 (1997).
16.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 186 (arguing that neuroscience evidence
should be admitted only to show structural abnormalities but not secondary evidence of brain
activity).
17.
United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 666 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (excluding
defendant's proffered PET scan evidence because it could easily mislead the jury).
18.
Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence, 554 PRACTICING L. INST. LIT. 799, 816

(1996).
19.

Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1251.
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processes. Part IV suggests a jury instruction that includes warnings
reflective of such risks.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. CurrentStandardsfor Admissibility
Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude evidence, and within the evidentiary framework, one of the
greatest challenges for courts is the task of determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence introduced through expert
testimony. 20 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that
"if any scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert ...

may testify thereto."2 1 Rule 702

22
additionally requires that the underlying science be valid.
As recent Supreme Court decisions have articulated, judges
serve as gatekeepers and therefore must determine the relevance and
reliability of scientific evidence before it reaches a jury.23 Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticalsand its progeny provide guidelines for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 and
in doing so emphasize the function of judges to "protect juries from
being bamboozled by technical evidence of dubious merit."24 When
evaluating the validity of proffered expert opinion, federal courts 2 are
required to assess four factors: (1) falsifiability, (2) error rate, (3) peer
review and publication, and (4) general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. 26 Using these guidelines, each court may make
its own determination regarding the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence in the case at hand.2 7 Because of the rate at which it is
advancing, it is conceivable that both structural and functional

20.
21.

Beggs, supra note 18, at 816, 818.
FED. R. EVID. 702.

22.

Id.

23.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
24.
Id; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1042 (N.D. Ill.
2003), a/ld, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
25.
Although states are not bound to follow the federal standard, over half have done so.
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 1:7, at 19 n. 8 (Thomson West 2008).

26.
27.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
Id. at 597.
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neuroimaging could soon reach a sufficient level of reliability to pass
28
the Daubert test on a consistent basis.
However, reliability and relevance are not the only filters for
scientific evidence; Rule 403 requires judges to balance the probative
value of the proffered evidence against that risk that the evidence may
create unfair prejudice for the opposing party, confuse the issues, or
mislead the jury.29 Many courts that have found neuroscience
evidence to be relevant and reliable have still excluded it because of
30
the risk that it will mislead the jury.
B. Fortifying the Gate
Rather than excluding neuroscience evidence as potentially
unreliable or confusing the jurors, this section identifies some
precautionary steps that permit the admission of the evidence while
3
recognizing and addressing its frailties. '
One possible solution is the use of court-appointed experts to
assist the judges, as authorized by Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.3 2 Concurring in General Elee. Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer
emphasized that, with the cooperation of the scientific community, the
Daubert gatekeeping task "would not prove inordinately difficult to
implement." 33 However, judges are reluctant to appoint experts
because they believe that (a) the measure is only to be used in
extraordinary circumstances and (b) the use of such experts will take
away from the adversarial system of justice because such experts
cannot be cross-examined.3 4
Furthermore, frequent use of
3
independent experts could prove costly to courts.

28.
57 (2007).
29.

Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1353FED. R. EVID. 403.

30.
E.g., United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Presenting defense
theories or psychiatric testimony . . .that do not truly negate mens rea may cause confusion
about what the law requires."); United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 666 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
31.
See, e.g., Snead, supra note 1, at 1291-93.
32.

FED. R. EVID. 706; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.

33.
522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997).
34.
Ass'n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000); Joe S.
Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:Defining a Role for Court-Appointed
Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1018-19 (1994) (noting that
attorneys are unable to cross-examine the expert and that any determinations made are not a
source of evidence).
35.
Beggs, supra note 18, at 840.
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Daubert also suggests that "[v]igorous cross-examination [and]
presentation of contrary evidence" are the "traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."3 6 But in criminal
trials, the quality of cross-examinations and effective presentation of
contrary evidence is reliant on the skill and dedication of each trial
attorney.3 7
Despite protections available through the Rules of
Evidence and the adversarial system, instructions to the jury often
serve as the last defense against questionable or potentially
misleading evidence.
II. UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE
Advances in scientific technology are expanding the universe of
potential evidence and forcing courts to make difficult decisions
regarding the admissibility, reliability, and probative value of such
evidence. Neuroscience offers tempting possibilities that science may
be able to reveal the inner workings of a person's mind.3 8 However,
the brain is a complex system, and science has only begun to probe the
relationship between the structure and functioning of the brain and
39
the resulting effect on human mental and behavioral processes.
A. Neuroimaging Technology
Before discussing the use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, it
is important to distinguish between brain structure and brain
functioning. The term "neuroimage" refers to computer- generated
representations of the brain and can be used to describe both
structural and functional images. 40 To observe the brain's structure,
experts typically use computed tomography (CT) scanning and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). 41 For example, these imaging
techniques can reveal a lesion or other physical abnormality caused by
a trauma, brain disease, or other reasons. 42 Some scholars argue that
courts should allow only this most basic form of brain imaging as

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

509 U.S. at 596.
See Underwood, supra note 13, at 177.
See Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1269.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1255.
Snead, supra note 1, at 1281.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 186.
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evidence in court because it depicts the physical, observable structures
43
of the brain.
The newer forms of neuroimaging technology, most notably the
functional MRI (fMVIRI), record the functioning of the brain by locating
active brain areas by measuring blood flow to particular region of the
brain. 44 While CT and MRI scans basically show a black and white
picture of the brain structure, the fMRI scans show localized changes
in blood flow, referred to as "hot spots."
A researcher then
superimposes these hot spots over a realistic three-dimensional
computer image of the brain to create a comprehensive picture of the
brain's structure and function. 4 This new technology has garnered
significant academic and public excitement because it creates the
possibility for scientists to discern a causal relationship between brain
function and corresponding cognitive processes such as thinking,
feeling, or believing. 46 Studies also indicate that fMRI technology may
also be able to identify the neural correlates of behaviors and
conditions such as deception, depression, addiction, racial perception,
and sexual preferences. 47 However, this technology cannot yet reliably
identify or predict the relationship between the human brain and
human behavior. Thus, the legal community should be cautious about
48
its use in court.
Figure 1: Comparison of MRI and fMRI Neuroimages

43.

Id.

44.
Snead, supra note 1, at 1282-84.
45.
Id.
46.
See id. at 1285.
47.
Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroirnaging Information: A Case for Neuro
Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 417 (2007).
48.
Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1266.
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The MRI scan, typically in black and white,
depicts the brain's structure.

i

The fl\IRI scan, typically in color, identifies
the level of blood flow to particular brain
regions, indicating both structure and
function.

B. Current and PotentialFuture Uses of Neuroscience in the
Courtroom
Despite the limits to the technology, neuroscience has the
potential to enormously benefit the legal field and neuroscience
49
evidence has already begun making its way into the courtroom.
However, due to the immaturity of fMVIRI technology, parties currently
use primarily CT and MRI images to show structural abnormalities in
the brain itself.5° In civil cases, structural neuroimaging evidence has
been proffered to prove actual harm to the brain in personal injury,
medical malpractice, and toxic exposure cases; additionally, structural
neuroimaging has been introduced in contract disputes to show that
one of the parties lacked sufficient cognitive capacity to form a valid
contract. 1 In the criminal context, defendants have attempted to
introduce neuroscience evidence at a number of points throughout the
process, including the preliminary determination of competency to
stand trial, the guilt phase, and the sentencing phase. 2 For example,
neuroscience evidence has been used as mitigating evidence during
the sentencing phase of capital trials to persuade the jury that a
particular defendant, due to abnormalities of the brain, has less
49.
50.
51.
52.

See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 186.
Snead, supra note 1, at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
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criminal culpability and should not be sentenced to death.5 3 This sort
of use is simpler: evidence admitted for the purpose of mitigation in
sentencing need not conform to the Rules of Evidence, and therefore
courts have had wider latitude in allowing defendants to introduce
4
neuroimaging evidence
Although the majority of neuroscience evidence is admitted
during the sentencing phase,55 neuroimaging has been allowed during
the guilt phase, particularly to argue the defendant's inability to form
the requisite mens rea or to raise an insanity defense.5 6 Still, using
scientific evidence to make a determination of a defendant's guilt or
57
innocence raises critical questions as to its reliability.
1. Mens Rea
In order to prove a defendant's guilt, the prosecution must
prove not only that the defendant committed each physical element of
the crime, but also that the defendant possessed the requisite level of
mental culpability (mens rea) at the time of the crime.5 8 In State v.
Anderson, defense counsel introduced expert testimony supported by
neuroscience evidence to show that the defendant's brain-damageinduced depression and paranoia negated his ability to premeditate
and deliberate in a manner sufficient to justify the charge of firstdegree murder.5 9
If science develops sufficiently to accurately show an
individual's brain functioning, neuroimaging evidence of a defendant's
state of mind may be admissible for future trials. Using functional
neuroimaging, it may be possible to determine whether a defendant is
being truthful in describing current or past perceptions. 60
Additionally, a charge of murder could be reduced to manslaughter if a
defendant could show that, at the time of the killing, the defendant

53.
Id. at 1293.
54.
Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDoZO L. REV. 1845, 1846 (2003).
55.
See id.; Snead, supra note 1.
56.
President's Council O;erview, supra note 9, at pt. II.A.1.
57.
Underwood, supra note 13, at 151.
58.
The Model Penal Code identifies four levels of mental culpability: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. § 2.02(2) (1981).
59.
79 S.W.3d 420, 433 (Mo. 2002). Despite the successful introduction of neuroscience
evidence, the jury found Anderson guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced him
to the death penalty. Id. at 429.
60.
Erin Ann O'Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, in LAW AND THE BRAIN
21, 29 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
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was provoked to a level that would cause the average person to lose
control. 61 For example, many legal and psychological theorists argue
that women who have been victims of domestic violence may "snap"
and kill their spouses even if there was no temporal provocation;
neuroimaging studies may help to prove the existence of a Battered
Women's Syndrome and show that "reasonable provocation" need not
62
be temporal in these circumstances.
2. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
Neuroimaging could also help courts make more accurate
assessments of defendants' sanity. The Supreme Court has ruled that
the Constitution requires that a state provide access to a psychiatrist's
evaluation when the defendant's sanity is disputed. 63 This holding
suggests willingness for federal trial courts to broadly admit
psychological evidence as part of an insanity defense. The same is
also true for some state courts. In 1994, a New York state appellate
court found that the trial court's failure to admit neuroimaging tests
64
as part of an insanity defense constituted reversible error.
Relying on the right to present psychiatric evidence, many
defendants have offered neuroscience evidence of brain deficiencies as
part of an insanity defense. One famous example of using brain
imaging as part of such a defense is United States v. Hinckley.65 In
that case, the defendant attempted to assassinate President Reagan. 66
At trial, the defense presented neuroscience evidence in the form of a
CAT scan indicating that the defendant may have been suffering from
an organic brain disease. 67 Although it isn't clear exactly what impact
the neuroscience evidence had, Hinckley was ultimately found not
guilty by reason of insanity. 68 In future cases, as the technology of
functional neuroimaging improves, experts may be able to testify to
69
specific cognitive defects that tend to show a defendant's insanity.
III. IDENTIFYING THE RISKS OF NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE USING
61.
President'sCouncil Overview, supra note 9, at pt. I.A. 1.
62.
Id.
63.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
64.
People v. Jones, 620 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
65.
525 F. Supp. 1342, 1348 (D.D.C. 1981).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
See Associated Press, Hin[c]kley Acquittal Brings Mores to Change Insanity Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at D21. It isn't clear what evidence most impacted the jury's finding.
69.
President's Council Overview, supra note 9, at pt. II.A.2.
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CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO REDUCE THEM

A. Risks of PresentingNeuroscience Evidence to the Jury
Assuming a defendant has access to psychological testing that
includes neuroimaging, the defense must first convince the trial judge
to admit an expert witness qualified to testify about the defendant's
neurological testing.7 0 If the evidence is admitted, there are several
potential risks posed by presenting it the jury, namely
misunderstanding, captivation, and interpretation.
1. Misunderstanding the Technical Limits of Neuroscience
Functional neuoroimaging provides information about brain
functioning in general, but it cannot fully explain brain functioning on
an individual basis. 71 An individual's brain could be affected by any
number of external factors or circumstances that may cause one
person to perform mental or behavioral tasks differently than another
person, only some of which are relevant to the justice system. 72 Thus,
there is no reliable baseline for determining whether one individual's
73
brain functioning qualifies as "normal."
Furthermore, the brain is incredibly complex-there is not one
single area that controls a person's thoughts or actions; 74 rather, there
is an interconnectedness between different parts of the brain that
cannot always be captured by scans or images. 7
Because fMRI
experiments measure brain activity while the subject performs one
simple and specific experimental task, it is difficult to extrapolate
results from the controlled experimental setting to everyday life,
76
where a person may be performing several tasks simultaneously.
Similarly, any given area of the brain could be responsible for
multiple cognitive functions and, therefore, imaging cannot

70.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
71.
Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will It Ever Be Ready for Prime Time?, 2
PLOS BIOLOGY 715, 716 (2004).
72.
Greely & Illes, supra note 11, at 382.
73.
See Snead, supra note 1, at 1289-90.
74.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 186-87.
75.
JOHN HORGAN, THE UNDISCOVERED MIND: HOW THE HUMAN BRAIN DEFIES
REPLICATION, MEDICATION, AND EXPLANATION 21-23 (1999), cited in Snead, supra note 1, at 1286

n.108.
76.
Greely & Illes, supra note 11, at 383. For example, one study asked participants to
memorize a long string of numbers while measuring blood flow to active brain regions during the
task. Bloom, supra note 12.
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conclusively demonstrate which function corresponds to an active
brain area. 77 Once a relationship is established between a brain area
and neural functioning, there is a deductive gap between the hard
science of the imaging studies and the subjective clinical
interpretations admissible as evidence in court. 78
Additionally,
research has not produced reliable diagnostic imaging tests to identify
psychological and mental impairment. 79 Although the technology is
rapidly evolving and it may quickly reach the point where certain
80
cognitive processes could be reliably identified using neuroimaging,
it is imperative that judges, lawyers, and jurors understand the
current limitations.
2. Captivation
Because brain images are "profoundly fascinating to view,
neuroimaging scans have the ability to unduly influence and captivate
the jury."8 1 Visual aids-including photographs, diagrams, and
charts-are often used in court, but images of the brain are especially
fascinating because a testifying expert endorses them as scientific
data.82 Images from fMRI scans are particularly problematic in the
courtroom because the visual impact is impressive compared to scans
produced by other imaging technology. 83 The fMRI scans produce a
realistic, three-dimensional image of the brain with color mapping of
blood flow, and their level of sophistication is not equaled by the blackand-white two-dimensional MRI images.
In addition to the captivating visual, the science of studying
the brain has a certain allure to laypersons. If society perceives the
brain to be powerfully determinative of who a person is, jurors, as well
as the lay public in general, may be willing to accept neuroscientific
explanations of behavior.8 4 Dr. Paul Bloom, a cognitive psychologist at

77.
Snead, supra note 1, at 1288.
78.
Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1259 (citing C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science
from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry:Expert Testimony in the Post-DaubertEra, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y
& L. 211 (1995)).
79.
Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1259.
80.
Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue
About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience,and Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 111 (2006).
81.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 182.
82.
Id.
83.
Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1257.
84.
Garland & Frankel, supra note 80, at 107-08.
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Yale, believes that brain imaging has a seductive appeal that exceeds
its actual power to explain mental and emotional states. 85 He writes:
Psychologists can be heard grousing that the only way to publish in Science or Nature is
with pretty color pictures of the brain. The media, critical funding decisions, precious
column inches, tenure posts, science credibility and the popular imagination have all
been influenced by fMRI's seductive but deceptive grasp 86
on our attentions. It's a
pervasive influence, and it's not because the science is better.

Since neuroscience mimics hard science more than other forms of
psychological testing, Dr. Bloom believes that fMRI imagery has
87
attained undue influence.
Professor Richard Underwood, a Professor of Law at University
of Kentucky College of Law, describes this phenomenon as the "gee
whiz factor. '88
Even if the expert witness is completely
straightforward about the significance of the results (whereas some
witnesses could attempt to overstate the significance of the results), a
juror may overestimate their importance because they are impressed
by the sophistication. 89 Deena Skolnick, a former graduate student at
Yale, captured this phenomenon in an experiment she performed
while in graduate school in which she asked her subjects to judge
different explanations of psychological occurrences. 90 She found that
people were generally able to identify incorrect explanations; however,
when researchers supplemented the incorrect explanations with a few
sentences of neuroscience reasoning-even though the neuroscience
explanations were inaccurate and unrelated-people tended to
perceive these explanations as more credible than those without the
neuroscience support. 9 1 Thus, the presence of a bit of apparently hard
92
science turned bad explanations into satisfactory ones.
3. Interpretation
When testifying as to the results of neuroimaging tests, a
qualified neuroscientist would "readily acknowledge the limited
evidentiary purposes for which neuroimaging is currently
appropriate." 93 However, neuroimaging is often introduced for the
85.
86.

Bloom, supra note 11.
Id.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Underwood, supra note 13, at 166.
Id.
Bloom, supra note 12.
Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1260.
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purpose of making a psychiatric diagnosis, and the testifying
psychiatrist (who may be an expert in mental illness rather than
neuroscience technology) may not have a thorough understanding of
the technical limits and problems of clinical application; accordingly,
94
she may be unable to adequately convey these issues to the jury.
Additionally, a skillful attorney could mislead even a qualified
neuroscientist during direct or cross examination, thus causing the
95
neuroscientist to overemphasize the diagnostic value of brain scans.
When this sort of misinterpretation occurs, the jury has no way of
understanding the technical limits of neuroscience unless the opposing
party calls a refuting expert witness or the court gives a cautionary
instruction.
B. The Use of Jury Instructions
Due to the high probative value of neuroscience evidence,
courts should not completely exclude neuroscience evidence on the
basis of the dangers noted above.
Instead, they should craft
cautionary jury instructions to lower the risk of prejudice. As part of
the final instructions to the jurors prior to their deliberation, the judge
instructs the jury regarding the weight or reliability of expert facts
and opinion testimony. 96 Factors to be considered by the jury in
determining the relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony
include: (1) ability and character of the witness, (2) witness's actions
on the witness stand, (3) weight and process of reasoning by which the
expert has supported her opinions, (4) possible bias in favor of side for
whom witness is testifying, (5) whether the witness is being paid, (6)
relative opportunities for study or observation of the subject at issue,
and (7) any other matters that serve to illuminate the witness's
statements.9 7 This final factor leaves open the possibility for courts to
give further instructions as needed for particularly troublesome
evidence.
1. Ineffectiveness of Current Pattern Jury Instructions
Jurors are generally instructed that they must make their own
determination as to the weight and credibility of the expert witness's
94.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 11, at 187; Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1259-60.
95.
Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1260.
96.
C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Instructions in Ciuil Case on the
Weight or Reliability of Medical Expert Testimony, 86 A.L.R.2d 1038, § 12 (1962).
97.
31A A.I JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 109 (Westlaw 2009).
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testimony in connection with the other evidence and that it is
permissible to reject the testimony entirely. 98 The sample general
instructions for consideration of expert witness in federal criminal
cases state:
You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it
such weight, if any, as you may think it deserves. You should consider the testimony of
expert witnesses just as you consider other evidence in this case. If you should decide
that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education or
experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are
not sound, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are
not sound, or if you should conclude that the opinion is outweighed by other evidence
[including that of other "expert witnesses'], you may disregard the opinion in part or in
its entirety. As I9have
told you several times, you - the jury - are the sole judges of the
9
facts of this case.

This pattern instruction does not indicate to the jury that there
may be problems of reliability inherent in the science or that scientific
images may exert undue influence; neuroscience evidence requires
more specific instructions to warn jurors of its potential risks.
Further, it may create an aura of infallibility by referring to the
10 0
witness as an "expert."
2. Dispelling Juror Captivation and Reminding Jurors of their Role as
Interpreters
Since the conveyance of scientific testimony aided by
captivating visual images suggests that the testimony is highly
persuasive, many courts fear that jurors will give undue weight to
information conveyed by experts.' 0 ' In addition, as discussed above
the reliability of neuroscience evidence is still a topic of debate in both
the scientific and legal communities. 10 2 Common sense suggests that
jurors will have some tendency to defer to a scientific expert rather
than trust their own knowledge and judgment, 10 3 causing courts fear
that expert testimony could cause the jurors to forget their roles as the
10 4
ultimate deciders of fact.

98.

Marvel, supra note 96, § 3.
99.
IA KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14:01
(6th ed. 2000) (emphasis in original).
100.
See Kulynych, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
101.
James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts
About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert
Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 636 (1984).

102.
103.
104.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
Doyle, supra note 101, at 637.
Id. at 640.
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However, through jury instructions, judges have some ability to
control the aura of expertise and remind jurors of their
responsibilities. 105
Although it would be "naive to think that a
cautionary instruction is always a 'talisman for the solution of any
possible prejudice problem,"' there are reasons to think that
cautionary instructions have some influence over jurors. 10 6 For
example, jurors are predisposed to trust their own judgment, and an
10 7
instruction that encourages them to do so should be well received.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun suggested that careful instruction on
the burden of proof should be a means of attacking "shaky but
admissible" evidence.108 Although the Court specifically referred to
instructions on the burden of proof, this comment generated interest
in the use of other types of jury instructions, including scientific
evidence. 109
Shortly after Daubert, Judge McKenna in the Southern District
of New York drafted a new cautionary instruction relating to forensic
expert testimony in United States v. Starzecpyzel." 0 The ruling came
on a motion by the defendant to exclude expert testimony on forensic
document examination (handwriting analysis or "FDE"). 111 The court
expressed concern that jurors could view FDE as a science instead of a
technical experience acquired by through "training, apprenticeships,
and long years of practice" and thereby defer to such testimony as an
infallible scientific finding. 112 Rather than excluding the evidence
because of its potential to improperly influence juries, the court ruled
that the prejudice problem does not require the exclusion of the
proffered testimony.11 3 "While [forensic] evidence presents special
challenges, '[t]he jury is intelligent enough.., to ignore what is
4
unhelpful in its deliberations."'1
As part of the protections required by such evidence, the court
suggested a cautionary jury instruction focused on the practical,
probative value of the evidence:
105.

Id.
106.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Excluding the Proponent's
Expert Testimony Due to the Opponent's Inability to Afford Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN. L. REV.
317, 350 (2007)(quoting United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 7, 82(2d Cir. 1979).
107.
Doyle, supra note 101, at 639.
108.
Daubert v. Merrell Down Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
109.
Imwinkelried, supra note 106, at 350.
110.
880 F. Supp. 1027, 1049 (1995).
111.
Id. at 1028.
112.
Id. at 1029.
113.
Id. at 1049.
114.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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Witnesses are usually permitted to testify only as to matters within their direct
experience, such as what they saw or what they did on a particular occasion. Witnesses
are not generally allowed to express their opinions. However, some individuals are
permitted to offer their opinions because they have acquired a skill, through their
training, education or experience, that few members of the general public possess. Such
witnesses are frequently referred to as "experts" or "expert witnesses."... You may
accept a forensic document examiner's testimony in whole, or you may reject it in whole.
If you find that the field of forensic document examination is not sufficiently reliable, or
that the particular document examiner is not sufficiently reliable, you are free to reject
the testimony in whole. You may also accept the testimony in part, finding, as one
possible example, that while the forensic document examiner has found significant
similarities and differences between various handwriting samples, his or her conclusion
as to the genuineness of a particular writing is in error, or is inconclusive. In any event,
you should not substitute the forensic document examiner's opinion for your own reason,
judgment, or common sense. I am not in any way suggesting
what you should do. The
11 5
determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you.

Such an instruction eliminates the assumption that an expert's
testimony is foolproof and suggests forensic scientists are not
scientists in the same way that physicists and chemists are, instead
comparing them to craftsmen. 116 This allows the jury to weigh the
evidence in its proper context.1 1 7 The instruction also indicates the
jurors need not accept the field of forensic document examination as a
reliable science, but can use their own judgment and common sense to
determine whether to credit the testimony. 118
However, the
instruction stops short of explaining precise limits of the FDE method
and therefore does not fully reduce the risks of jury captivation or
misinterpretation.
3. The "Expert Substitute" Instruction to Explain Technical
Limitations and Potentially Unreliable Clinical Applications
Some courts have responded to the problem of scientifically
unreliable testimony by allowing opponents to introduce an expert
witness solely for the purpose of refuting the science underlying the
earlier opinion.1 1 9 As a less costly alternative, courts have used
cautionary "expert substitute" jury instructions to educate jurors
about the risks and frailties of the earlier testimony.1 20 In United
115.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp at 1050.
116.
Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic
Flaws, and JudicialGatekeeping, JUDGES' J., Fall 2005 at 31.
117.
Id.
118.
See id.
119.
Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries
and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 261, 310-311 (2008).
120.
See, e.g., United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); State v.
Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953, 961 (Utah 2002).
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States v. Burrous, expert substitute instructions were used to explain
121
the dangers of misidentification inherent in eyewitness testimony.
Rather than admitting expert testimony about the frailty of
eyewitness and lineup identification, the court included the following
language in its instructions to the jury:
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you heard in this
case must be scrutinized carefully. Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the
dangers of mistake in human perception and identification ....
You may also consider
that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar
individuals, or a group of photographs of similar individuals, is generally more reliable
than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness or
among a group of persons with significantly different appearances. 122

In Canadian courts, judges offer even more cautionary jury
instruction on the frailties of eyewitness testimony including matters
such as the weak relationship between eyewitness confidence and
accuracy, the risk of mistakenly identifying as the perpetrator one
whose face is familiar from another context, and the low value of incourt identifications. 123 However, most courts in the United States
refrain from offering such detailed instructions regarding witness
testimony for fear that it would be construed on appeal as judicial
comment on the evidence that threatens to invade the province of the
jury. 124 As a result, trial courts must walk a fine line between
mitigating the risk that scientific expert testimony will overly
influence the jury and the risk that cautionary instructions will do the
same.
To alleviate this problem, reviewing courts should allow the
trial judge greater latitude in crafting cautionary instructions
regarding the jury's assessment of expert testimony. Neuroimaging
evidence has the potential to make significant contributions to the
justice system but also carries a particular risk of captivating jurors
and causing them to rely on immature science, and judges should have
the freedom to caution jurors about those risks.

121.
Burrous, 934 F. Supp. at 530. Although eyewitness testimony is not a form of expert
evidence, the idea of explaining the risks inherent in a certain form of testimony is the same. Id.
122.
Id. at 530-31.
123.
Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries
and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 261, 296-97 (2008).
124.
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 337 (3d ed. 1997).
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INSTRUCTION

This sample jury instruction incorporates concepts from several
of the above instructions, including: (1) instructing the jury not to
assume the testifying witness is a scientific expert, but rather a
witness qualified as an expert for the purposes of trial, (2) describing
some limitations of neuroscience (the expert substitute instruction),
(3) instructing jurors that they may accept or reject neuroscience
evidence on the whole, and (4) reminding jurors of their role as factfinders.
1. Description of the Witness: Ordinarily, witnesses are permitted to testify only as to
matters within their direct experience, such as what they saw or what they did on a
particular occasion. Witnesses are not generally allowed to express their opinions.
However, some individuals are permitted to offer their opinions because they have
particular training, education or experience that few members of the general public
possess. Such witnesses are frequently referred to as "experts" or "expert witnesses."
Today, you heard testimony from
, who has been trained in the field of
[neuroscience/psvchiatrvl. 12 5 [Witness name] was permitted to use visual aids to assist
with his/her testimony.
2. Technical and Interpretive Risks: I want to caution you, first, that the kind of
testimony you heard in this case must be scrutinized carefully. The field of neuroscience
is not a precise science, like physics or chemistry, but a technique of viewing the human
brain and interpreting the images. The conclusions from this interpretation are
subjective, not objective scientific fact. Researchers cannot determine with complete
certainty how a particular area of the brain or an abnormality in that area will affect a
given individual. 1 26 They also cannot determine with complete certainty the connection
between a person's brain and his or her thoughts, beliefs, or actions.127 The images
used to assist during the testimony should not be mistaken for proof of any relevant
facts in this case. All testimony is that witness's professional opinion, and you must
determine whether to credit or reject the evidence.
[For fMRI imaging: Researchers cannot use neuroimaging to identify the specific cause
of behavior, but instead can only see which areas of the brain are active when a person
is performing a particular task. For example, if the frontal region is active while a
person is recalling a past event, the researcher would be able to detect this. However,
the information does not necessarily indicate that a person exclusively uses his frontal
region for recollection a person can use multiple areas of the brain for a given activity,
and similarly each area of the brain could control multiple functions. 128]
3. Juror's Responsibility: You may accept the testimony in whole, or you may reject it in
whole. If you find that the field of neuroscience is not sufficiently reliable, or that the
particular witness is not sufficiently reliable, you are free to reject the testimony in
whole. You may also accept the testimony in part, finding, as one possible example, that
while the witness has found significant similarities and differences between various
patterns of brain function, his or her conclusion as to the genuineness of a particular

125.
126.
127.
128.

See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See discussion supra Part H.A.1.
See Kulynych, supra note 15, at 1259.
Id.
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diagnosis is in error, or is inconclusive. In any event, you should not substitute the
witness's opinion for your own reason, judgment, or common sense. I am not in any way
suggesting what you should do. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely
with you.

These instructions focus on the difference between an expert
witness's opinion and scientific fact and remind the jurors that they
must determine the facts of the case. In an attempt to dispel the aura
of infallibility, they also carefully refer to the "witness" rather than
the "expert witness."
Like the jury instruction about Forensic
Document Examination, 129 it suggests that the field of neuroscience is
130
not a hard science, but rather a matter of interpretation.
Although the instruction does not give detailed information
about the science, it conveys enough information to alert the jury
about its possible shortcomings. In some jurisdictions, the judge may
be able to give even more explicit instructions regarding the
neuroscience as a definitive explanation for human behavior and the
problem of image captivation. As discussed above, it would be ideal
for reviewing courts to allow more latitude for trial courts in
instructing jurors on neuroscience or other forms of complex scientific
evidence. 131 However, a reviewing court could determine that such an
instruction constitutes impermissible comment on the evidence, and
could overturn the trial court's judgment. As neuroscience advances,
neuroimaging evidence will become increasingly sophisticated, and
courts must be able to keep up by using advanced jury instructions
that reflect the risks of using and understanding the technology.
V. CONCLUSION

The increasing public, legal, and academic interest in the field
of neuroscience indicates that neuroimaging evidence may assume a
more prominent position in a variety of types of litigation. However,
the technology is still relatively new, and many of the capabilities of
neuroscience are not yet known. Courts should proceed with extreme
caution when determining the evidentiary admissibility of
neuroscience evidence. In cases where the evidence is admitted, the
court must carefully instruct jurors so as to the limits and risks of the
science. Although many legal theorists question the effectiveness of
jury instructions, clear instructions that list specific risks may be wellreceived by jurors and will reduce the risks of admitting the
129.
130.
131.

United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
See supra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part III.2.c.
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evidence. 132 The sample instruction offered in this note cover some of
the major risks by identifying technical, professional, and scientific
limitations of neuroscience evidence.
History shows that science has often been used inappropriately
in the creation of law and public policy. In the late nineteenth
century, the theory of anthropological criminality, proposed by Italian
scientist Cesare Lombroso, advanced the notion that criminals were
born with detectable physiological inferiorities that could be identified
and categorized to predict a person's predisposition toward
criminality. 133
In particular, Lombroso believed that Southern
Italians were more prone to crime than Northern Italians, and
Lombroso's followers subscribed to the idea that certain races and
34
ethnic groups were genetically more likely to commit crimes.
Although this theory was eventually discredited, similar theories may
still impact modern criminal profiling.
One of the most harrowing examples of legal misuse of science
was the emergence of eugenic sterilization laws in the United States
during the 1920s and 1930s. Like Lombroso's theory, the idea was to
identify and sterilize the "feeble-minded" and thereby eliminate
inherited criminality.135
The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of such laws. 3 6 The words of Justice Holmes should
serve as a cautionary tale:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough. 137

While scientific research and experimentation is primarily a
continuing dialogue of hypotheses, replication, and reevaluation, the
132.
See discussion supra Part III.2.b.
133.
Garland & Frankel, supra note 80, at 109-10. Lombroso outlined fourteen
characteristics that he believed indicated a predisposition towards criminal behavior: unusually
short or tall height; small head, but large face; fleshy lips, but thin upper lip; protuberances
(bumps) on head, in back of head and around ear; wrinkles on forehead and face; large sinus
cavities or bumpy face; tattoos on body; receding hairline; bumps on head, particularly above left
ear; large incisors; bushy eyebrows, tending to meet across nose; large eye sockets, but deep-set
eyes; beaked or flat nose; strong jaw line; small and sloping forehead; small or weak chin; thin
neck; sloping shoulders, but large chest; large, protruding ears; long arms; high cheek bones;
pointy
or
snubbed
fingers
or
toes.
Wikipedia,
Anthropological
Criminology,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal-anthropology (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
134. Id.
135.
Garland & Frankel, supra note 80, at 110.
136. Id.
137.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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legal field operates on a more pressing time frame, using the available
tools to solve an immediate conflict.138 These examples illuminate the
risks of using brain imaging to solve immediate conflicts or predict
future behavior, and judges and lawyers should proceed slowly and
carefully when considering the use of neuroscience evidence,
particularly when making decisions regarding a person's guilt or
innocence.
Courts must be aware that the connection between what
scientists know about general brain physiology and functioning and
what clinicians can determine by studying an individual brain is
tenuous and unsupported by significant scientific data. 139 However,
the use of neuroimaging evidence in the courtroom is likely to
increase 40 and, as a result, courts must have a strategy for how to
frame such evidence for the jury. Certainly, jury instructions should
only be one piece of a court's cautionary strategy, but they represent a
significant step towards striking a balance between excluding the
evidence and confusing the jurors.
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